Agorism embraces the idea of basic respect for persons, though Konkin may never have spelled it out in these terms. The core idea is that the individual is inherently worthwhile, and no one has a right to own or otherwise control the peaceful actions of that person. However, what is missing from agorism, voluntaryism, and anarchism in general is a firm moral grounding. I am not saying that these, inasmuch as they differ, are not moral, but rather that as positions they rely upon slogans rather than well fleshed-out moral theories. These tell us some actions to take and what the end goal is, but without the sort of foundation that any social system should have. We are told what is “right” without any strong moral foundation to point to in order to explain why these are right. One position will tell us that it is right to take from one group to give to another, and at best they say that it is right because the second group needs it. But does that really justify anything? Of course not. Another may argue that egalitarianism is inherently right, but here again they do not have any basis for such claims. This is why we need a fully fleshed out description of morality to support any given position, including agorism.

As agorists we are not much different from those who argue for taking from one group to give to another. For instance, we tend to say that all voluntary interaction is right, and of course that is true. But why? Why are voluntary actions moral but involuntary ones not? “It’s obvious,” is not a good answer. Almost everyone believes that their beliefs are “obviously” true.

Some may object, saying that agorism is a political ideology, not a moral one. The problem with this approach is that all political ideology involves moral agents, and how moral agents interact. This is the bailiwick of morality. This is the central arena for morality. Arguments against having a strong moral foundation should make us skeptical of the agenda of those denying this need.

So, if slogans like the Non-Aggression Principle are not themselves moral theories, what does a moral theory look like? A moral theory should tell us not only what is moral, but what entities morality is concerned with, what general rules there are, methods for exceptions, and what areas morality covers. Even Natural Law appeals are — at best — appeals to tradition or authority. It is perfectly reasonable to ask, “but why natural law instead of something else?”

Until the last few decades moral theorists would tell us how morality ought to be, rather than how it is. Sure, they would say that their theory was morality, but they never started with a description of reality. Instead they started with their pet theory, whether that be utilitarianism, Kantian Deontology, or even Rand’s selfishness. Religion adopted a similar approach though it often also confused religious rules for moral rules.

Thankfully, the field of moral theory is catching up to all other areas of philosophy in that it is increasingly focused on describing reality as it is, rather than creating nifty schemes telling us how morality would be in a perfect world.

Bernard Gert is spearheading this effort with his Morality: Its Nature and Justification. In this work he describes why morality exists, what sorts of entities are necessary for morality to exist, what actions are morally relevant, and how and why exceptions to the general moral rules exist. In other words, he gives us a fully fleshed out moral theory, and given that he starts with observation of reality, then simply describes what has happened and what form reality takes, his moral theory is verifiable in ways that no theory in the past has been.

There is not enough space to go into a full description of morality here, or why it is the way that it is, so a brief summary will have to suffice. Morality exists because we are thinking creatures who can be harmed. We seek to avoid harm, by and large, so we evolved to respect that there are others who are also thinking creatures that seek to avoid harm. It matters that the type of thinking we are concerned with here is definitely higher-level thinking and reasoning.

As thinking entities that can act on our decisions, we are responsible for those actions. This makes us morally culpable for harm we do to other moral agents. As vulnerable entities, who are not irrational, we seek to avoid harm to ourselves and those for whom we care, unless there is sufficient compensation. What counts as sufficient compensation will vary given the type of harm and the degree of compensation, but we can all imagine the easy cases. You are offered a hundred million dollars to break the promise to meet your spouse for lunch. Virtually all of us would take the money and accept the consequences of violating that promise. Most spouses would gladly understand as well. If you were offered a quarter to cut off your arm, well here again this is an easy case since the loss of ability and the pain involved in cutting off your arm cannot be compensated by a mere fraction of a dollar.

So, because we want to avoid these harms to ourselves and those for whom we care, we are rationally motivated to recognize that there are others with similar desires, and similar vulnerabilities, who are also non-irrational entities that can made decisions and action on them. In other words, we recognize the moral agency of others to have them recognize our moral agency. This is far too quick of an explanation but given the space here, it will have to suffice.

Morality deals only with interaction between moral agents. If there is no harm to a moral agent, then there is no moral issue. It is only where an innocent moral agent is harmed that we have a moral issue. This idea should not be surprising, yet virtually all moral theories, and all religious doctrines, not only overlook this fact but very often they deny it by proscribing behaviors that affect no other moral agent. This is one of the ways that we can separate morality from religious doctrine or the “nifty scheme” approaches of utilitarianism and Kantian deontology.

In his work Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Bernard Gert describes a set of moral rules that he believes is not only complete but not redundant.

1. Do not kill.

2. Do not cause pain.

3. Do not disable.

4.Do not deprive of freedom.

5. Do not deprive of pleasure.

6. Do not deceive.

7. Keep your promises.

8 Do not cheat.

9 Obey the Law.

10. Do your duty.

The savvy reader will have noticed already that one of these rules seems to go directly against agorism: Obey the Law. We all have seen laws that are patently immoral from laws against behaviors that harm no one, to laws supporting slavery. Clearly “Obey the Law” cannot be a moral rule without a great deal more explanation. In 1998, I had a chance to sit down with Gert and this was the first thing I asked about. His answer, while perhaps understandable, did not fit into his own system as neatly as he would have liked. What he envisioned was a situation where all the other moral rules were obeyed such that there would be no inherently immoral laws, leaving only laws of convenience. He saw speed limits, laws concerning food safety, and other “practical” laws as being what would be covered under this rule. However, this reason isn’t the reason for the existence of the moral rules. They don’t exist for mere practical concerns but because real harm is caused if those are not followed. As we have seen with food inspection laws, real harm can occur anyway, perhaps worse harm because people relied upon the state to protect them. And on the other side of the coin, there is no guarantee or even probability of harm to innocents if such laws don’t exist. For these reasons, we must disregard Gert’s suggestion that “Obey the Law” is a moral rule.

“Do your duty” can be similarly dismissed since your moral duties are all spelled out by the other moral rules. No other duty can exist, so having a separate rule telling us to obey the existing rules is unnecessary.

Finally, “Keep your promises” and “Do not deceive” cover the situations that may crop up under “Do not cheat”, so we can reduce the list to a total of seven rules:

1. Do not kill.

2. Do not cause pain.

3. Do not disable.

4.Do not deprive of freedom.

5. Do not deprive of pleasure.

6. Do not deceive.

7. Keep your promises.

These rules are universal in that they apply to all moral agents, both as protections and obligations, but they are not absolute. What this means is that unlike the Kantian Categorical Imperative, there are justified exceptions to the rules. “Do not kill” has a quite obvious strongly justified exception: self-defense and defense of others. We don’t expect anyone to sacrifice themselves or those for whom they care in order to protect those who would cause us harm.

Gert goes into the mechanics of exceptions, but for our purposes here, it is enough to understand that the rules are not absolute. There are circumstances where violating the moral rule may be justified.

So, what does all of this have to do with agorism?

As agorists we are not choosing our actions based on what is legal and accepted, but rather on what is right and effective. This means that our actions may fall into grey areas of the law, or outright just ignore the law.

The usual statist response to such tactics is to declare that without law there would be chaos. Understanding morality helps us understand what actions are right and justified, as well as why spontaneous order happens with regard to personal interaction. Furthermore, as we are trying to convince others to adopt our peaceful and practical approaches, we must be above reproach. We must limit our own actions to those actions which do not harm innocent others else risk being dismissed as hypocrites.

There is one more vital element of morality: Moral ideals. Morality covers our lives in three areas.

The morally prohibited (Bad, evil)
The morally obligatory (Moral rules, Duties)
The morally good. (Moral ideals)

The last two are often combined leading to confusion and bizarre claims of positive moral duties. They are, in fact, two very different types of actions. We are morally required to refrain from harming others. That’s really it. But not harming someone is nothing to celebrate. This is our baseline. We go above that baseline when we act so as to reduce harm or increase the positive in the life of others. Such are the actions we celebrate and offer up praise. Such actions are never required.

On the surface, this may seem to be a pedantic addition, but it offers what I believe to be a unique pairing with agorism. Since we want to demonstrate that government is evil and obsolete, often our actions in creating alternative solutions to the problems of others will be in the realm of moral ideals. If we can alleviate harm and promote that which is beneficial to others, those others will be very inclined to listen to our ideas. What better way to sway people to the ideas of liberty and respect for persons? In this way, we can win the minds of people by first winning their hearts. We can show compassion as well as reason and justice in solving the problems that we are told only government can solve. Solutions in these areas are definitive proof that government is not merely unnecessary but unjust as well.

I have just touched on the high points of morality, moral theory, and the refutation of Gert’s application of his own methodology here as it applies to agorism. There is a great deal more needed to fully understand the nature of morality and some of the subtleties involved. Understanding this moral foundation helps us understand why the Non-Aggression Principle seems so right and helps us explain to others why voluntary interaction is vital. If you are interested in more information, Morality: Its Nature and Justification is a great resource. Though fair warning: it is an academic tome.